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VII.  AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND GOVERNMENT




Since  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiating  mandate  sought  “greater  liberalization  of
trade in agriculture”, WTO members have been locked in an intense debate on the nature
and extent of trade liberalization in agriculture.  Various perspectives of agricultural trade
liberalization have come to the fore in the debate.  The proponents of the trade liberalization
agenda have argued aggressively in favour of dismantling the tariff walls as, in their view,
this would bring significant global welfare gains.  However, opposing voices have emphasized
the fact that significant non-trade concerns exist, which would have to be given precedence
over the trade agenda.  This chapter reviews traditional arguments for trade liberalization
and provides a closer look at the additional reasons for use of government intervention,
including trade policy, in agriculture in a developing country, with particular reference to
India.
A.  Rationale for liberalizing agricultural trade
The case for liberalizing agricultural trade has been built on arguments, the origins
of  which  can  be  traced  back  to  the  pure  theory  of  international  trade.    According  to
these arguments, trade liberalization provides the “optimal solution”, but only under “ideal”
market conditions.  Some of the key assumptions that are made in this regard are that:
(a) markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive; (b) producers minimize costs subject
to  constant  returns  to  scale;  (c)  consumers  maximize  their  utility;  and  (d)  all  markets,
including that for labour, are cleared with flexible prices.
While  the  earlier  studies  enumerated  the  welfare  implications  of  adoption  or
otherwise of free trade policies in largely conceptual terms, the more recent studies have
provided precise estimates of the welfare gains that would result from the liberalization of
agricultural trade.  Among the more influential of these studies are those that have used
general equilibrium models.
In a series of papers published during the past few years, World Bank economists
have  provided  detailed  projections  by  simulating  the  possible  outcomes  of  the  Doha
Round negotiations.
1
1 The  most  quoted  of  these  papers  are  by  Kym Anderson,  Will  Martin  and  Dominique  van  der
Mensbrugghe  (2005  and  2006)  and  Van  der  Mensbrugghe  (2004);  see  reference  list.    See  also
chapters IV and V in this volume.212
The first major set of results reported in the papers pertains to the effect of the
ongoing trade liberalization efforts on real income up to 2015.  These estimates have been
made against the benchmark that assumes a complete freeing of merchandise trade over
the period 2005-2010.  It has been projected that real income gains by 2015 for the global
economy as a whole would be US$ 287.3 billion per year (in 2001 US dollars).  Of this
increase,  the  share  of  developed  countries  would  be  US$  201.6  billion  while  for  the
developing countries the gains would be US$ 85.7 billion.  In other words, the share of the
developing countries would be a third of the total global gains.  More importantly, real
income gains reported for the developing countries would be 0.8 per cent of the baseline
income  in  2015,  which  is  marginally  higher  than  the  corresponding  figure  for  the
developed  countries  (0.6  per  cent).    Among  the  developing  countries,  the  relatively
prosperous Latin American region is expected to register real income, which would be
1 per cent of the baseline income in 2015 while for the South Asian region the corresponding
figure would only be 0.4 per cent.
These broad results lend themselves to two varying interpretations.  The first one,
which has been provided in the papers referred to above, is that the results are significantly
favourable for the developing countries since their expected real income gains are considerably
larger than their existing share in global production.  Thus, while the developing countries
as a whole account for a quarter of the global production at present, they would be able to
enjoy a third of the global gains in real income that is expected annually until 2015.  An
alternate view would be that the results are pointing to the increasing gulf between the
relatively prosperous and poorer regions and countries.
In  overall  terms,  it  could  be  said  that  the  disproportionately  large  gains  for  the
developed countries that the papers under discussion have predicted would reinforce the
status of the lesser players in the global economy as “developing”, even after the so-called
“development round” has been implemented.  What is more, the results point to increasing
differentiation  between  the  developing  countries,  as  the  more  prosperous  regions  are
slated to record relatively larger increases in real income.
The disaggregated results provided for a small set of countries broadly reinforce
the above-mentioned conclusions.  India is expected to register a real income gain of only
US$ 3.4 billion a year, which is 0.4 per cent of the base line income in 2015.  In the case
of China, the corresponding figures are US$ 5.6 billion and 0.2 per cent, respectively.  On
the other hand, countries such as Thailand are expected to gain US$ 7.7 billion, while for
Argentina the real income gain could be nearly US$ 5 billion.
Although the proponents of trade liberalization have made significant claims about
the gains that would arise from dropping the tariff walls, the empirical evidence provided
by the stylised models fails to provide clinching proof that the lesser players in the global
economy would have much to gain from the process.  An important issue that arises in this
context is whether the models have made the right predictions, given that they represent
a vastly simplified image of the real world.  Most significantly, the theoretical basis of these
models,  i.e.,  a  distortion-free  perfectly  competitive  world,  needs  to  be  re-assessed
(Dhar, 2006 and chapter V in this publication).213
Indeed, through the many decades that trade theory has been developing, it has
been at pains to evolve a credible conceptual framework that can capture cross-border
transactions.  One of the major challenges that trade theory has been confronted with is
the provision of a sound basis for the “appropriate set of policy interventions that can
accommodate the plethora of distortions that rule the real world.  The use of trade protection
measures  has  been  an  anathema  for  the  economists  credited  with  developing  the
so-called  “pure  theory”  of  trade.    In  fact,  much  of  the  debate  on  trade  theory  in  the
decades prior to the advent of strategic trade theory – which boldly announces the use of
government  interventions  for  realizing  national  policy  objectives,  given  the  reality  of
imperfectly competitive markets – has tried to provide narrowly defined exceptions for the
use of interventions.  The following section provides an account of how trade theory has
dealt with the issue of the use of interventionist policy.
B.  Trade theory and the use of interventions
The  free  trade  world,  as  several  generations  of  economists  have  reminded  us,
provides Pareto optimal outcomes.  The equilibrium is reached as the marginal rate of
transformation in domestic production and the marginal rate of substitution in consumption
and  foreign  trade  would  be  equalized.    Furthermore,  under  assumptions  of  free  trade,
domestic  prices  are  equalized  with  landed,  foreign  prices  –  and  domestic  prices  are
equated with the marginal rate of transformation in production and the marginal rate of
substitution in consumption.  Argued in a somewhat different framework, proponents of the
free trade ideal put forth the notion that opening up of trade, from an erstwhile situation of
trade restrictions, would result in global welfare maximization in the long term.  The gains
would  accrue  as  trade  creates  conditions  for  securing  benefits  through  comparative
advantage (Bhagwati, 1969, p.11ff.).
The fundamental proposition that a protagonist of free trade would make is that
adjustment costs do not arise in the long-term perspective.  The process through which
this happens was well summarized by F.W. Taussig:  “The free trader argues that if the
duties  were  given  up  and  the  protected  industries  pushed  out  of  the  field  by  foreign
competitors,  the  workmen  engaged  in  them  would  find  no  less  well-paid  employment
elsewhere”.
2    Gottfried  Haberler  (1950)  formulated  the  same  idea,  but  somewhat
differently:  “We may conclude that in the long term the working class as a whole has
nothing to fear from international trade, since, in the long term, labour is the least specific
of all factors.  It will gain by the general increase in productivity due to the international
division of labour, and is not likely to lose at all seriously by a change in the functional
distribution of national income”.
3
2 F.W.  Taussig,  Principles  of  Economics  (1939,  p.  516),  quoted  by  Stolper,  Wolfgang  and  Paul
A. Samuelson (1941).
3 Gottfried Haberler (1950), “The Theory of International Trade”, quoted by Stolper, Wolfgang and
Paul A. Samuelson (1941).214
Conceptualized in the terms of the two-factor framework, the meaning of the above
conclusions arrived at by Taussig and Haberler is fairly obvious.  Unemployment of resources
would be ruled out in a free trade world, since the lowering of protection would automatically
trigger an adjustment process that would result in a market clearing outcome.
These virtues of free trade notwithstanding, it was argued that use of protectionist
measures could be justified under specific circumstances.  In the view of Haberler (1950)
and  subsequently  H.G.  Johnson  (1965),  one  such  situation  would  be  when  there  was
immobility of the factors of production or factor prices suffered from rigidities.
It  may  be  pointed  out  that  a  situation  of  factor  immobility  in  relative  terms,  in
particular involving the labour force engaged in the rural sector, is the stark reality that
faces many developing countries.  In those countries, although the relative importance of
agriculture has declined quite significantly in recent years (as is apparent from the declining
share  of  the  sector  in  GDP,  the  share  of  the  rural  population  has  not  declined  in  any
meaningful manner.  Table 1 captures this reality for some developing countries, including
India and China.
Table 1.  Changing importance of agriculture and the rural sector
in selected developing countries
Low income
China India Indonesia developing
Year
countries
Agriculture, Rural Agriculture, Rural Agriculture, Rural Agriculture, Rural
value added populationvalue added populationvalue added population  value added population
(% of GDP) (% of total) (% of GDP) (% of total) (% of GDP) (% of total) (% of GDP) (% of total)
1970 35.2 82.6 46.1 80.1 44.9 82.5 43.6 81.3
1975 32.4 82.6 41.3 78.8 30.2 80.5 39.7 79.7
1980 30.1 80.4 38.9 77.0 24.0 78.4 36.6 77.4
1985 28.4 77.0 33.7 75.7 23.2 73.6 34.3 76.1
1990 27.0 72.3 31.3 74.5 19.4 69.7 32.4 74.7
1995 19.8 68.9 28.2 73.4 17.1 64.2 29.9 73.2
2000 14.8 64.4 23.7 72.1 15.6 58.3 26.8 71.6




Source: World Development Indicators (2006).
The asymmetry between the fast decline of agriculture’s share in GDP and the
slow  fall  of  the  share  of  rural  population  is  most  significant  in  China  and  India.    The
situation  looks  particularly  difficult  for  India,  which  has  seen  a  halving  of  the  share  of
agriculture in GDP over the past three decades while the share of its rural population has
declined by a mere 10 per cent.  It is also important to note that paid employment in215
agriculture in India (about 5 per cent in 2004) falls very much behind China (60 per cent in
2003), Indonesia (44 per cent in 2005) and some other developing countries, according
to International Labour Organization Online Statistics and Asian Development Bank Kew
Indicators.
This situation has emerged in many developing countries because of a structural
bias against agriculture in the so-called development policies that those countries have
adopted over the past several decades.  One of the manifestations of the bias against
agriculture was reflected in the form of distortions in the labour market.  Johnson (1965)
offered two reasons for such a distortion that are commonly advanced in the literature on
economic development, both of which pertain to distortion in the labour market.  First,
earnings of labour in agriculture exceed the marginal productivity of agricultural labour, so
that the industrial wage must exceed the alternative opportunity cost of labour.  Second,
industrial wages exceed wages in agriculture by a margin greater than can be accounted
for by the disutility or higher cost of urban life.
It may be argued that most distortions, including those in the labour market, in
developing countries were imposed by adopting policies that provided excessive protection
to the industrial sector.  In many cases, agriculture was also taxed, in the sense that the
imperatives such as attainment of food security and, in particular, providing the population
with the basic food items at affordable prices was responsible for agricultural producers
being unable to realize the efficiency prices for their products.
The  policy  bias  against  agriculture  in  developing  countries  was  reflected  in  the
tardy deployment of the relatively scarce resource, capital.  India stands out as a case in
point.  In the early 1980s, the share of agriculture in the gross capital formation in the
country was close to 20 per cent; however, by the turn of the century, this figure had
declined  to  a  mere  6  per  cent,  despite  overall  growth  in  investment  across  the  whole
economy.  Quite clearly, therefore, agriculture in India has been affected by the domestic
distortion, caused largely by the policy bias.  Under such circumstances, trade theorists
may require interaction in the form of tariffs or subsidies, or both.
Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) provided a conceptual framework for the use of
tariffs  and  subsidies  in  the  presence  of  domestic  distortions.    Given  the  objective  of
realizing an optimum solution that is characterized by the quality of the foreign rate of
transformation  (FRT),  the  domestic  rate  of  transformation  in  production  (DRT)  and  the
domestic rate of substitution (DRS), Bhagwati and Ramaswami postulated that a policy
permitting the attainment of maximum welfare involved a tax-cum-subsidy on domestic
production.  A tariff-alone policy would, in their view, equate DRT and FRT, but would
destroy  the  equality  between  DRS  and  FRT.    By  the  same  token,  a  subsidy-alone
intervention would tend to establish parity between DRT and FRT, but would destroy the
equality between DRS and DRT.
If,  in  the  earlier  decades,  trade  theorists  were  discussing  issues  related  to
distortions  as  exceptional  cases  to  the  free  trade  ideal  that  they  stood  by,  in  recent
decades the advent of strategic trade theory changed all of that.  The 1970s saw the216
initiation of a discourse that challenged the fundamentals of the traditionalist view of trade
theory.    This  body  of  literature  was  based  on  the  premise  that  global  markets  were
characterized by imperfect competition.  Using the conceptual bases from the theory of
industrial organization, the proponents of this view argued that under imperfect competition,
there was a possibility that interventionist trade policies might have beneficial “strategic”
effects (Helpman and Krugman, 1989).  Based on this understanding, the strategic trade
theorists have analysed various situations in which government intervention can be justified.
The original idea of strategic trade theory was propounded by Brander and Spencer
(1981 and 1984),
4 who showed that government intervention could raise national welfare
by shifting oligopoly rents from foreign to domestic firms.  They argued that the grant of
export subsidies would have the effect of a deterrent on foreign exports, as a result of
which profits of the home firm would rise more than the amount of subsidy.  This would
result in a rise in home income through increased rent capture by a domestic firm.  Little or
no consideration, however, was given to domestic consumers in those early models on
strategic trade policy.
The large body of literature that has since emerged has provided analytical insights
into  the  functioning  of  the  various  sectors  (largely  in  the  context  of  the  United  States’
economy) in which interventions of the type that this school of trade theory has tried to
conceptualize are prevalent.
5  These studies have assessed the potential gains from using
strategic  trade  policies.   They  have  concluded  that  carefully  designed  import  tariffs  or
export subsidies can ensure better outcomes that free trade in certain markets, mostly in
differentiated manufactured products associated with oligopolistic market structures.  At
the same time, however, the authors emphasized the point that their findings should in no
way be interpreted as general support for pro-interventionist policies.
While it is industry that has been the focus of analytical studies using strategic
trade theory, there have been some attempts to look at “strategic trade” issues in agriculture
(Reimer and Stiegert, 2006).  Arguably, a number of markets for agricultural products are
also associated with a high concentration of “agents”, indicating potential applicability of
“strategic” policy interventions in the agricultural sector by developing countries.  Hamilton
and  Stiegert  (2002)  and  Dong,  Marsh  and  Stiegert  (2006)  examined  the  case  of  the
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) in the international durum wheat market; the latter examined
CWB and Australian Barley Board (ABB) in the malting barley market (Reimer and Stiegert,
2006).  These studies argued that state trading enterprises (STEs) such as CWB and ABB
fitted the requirements associated with strategic trade theory in at least three major ways.
First, the markets for both durum wheat and malting barley are characterized by imperfect
competition.  While CWB was found to be controlling 40-60 per cent of the global durum
wheat  market,  the  malting  barley  market  was  effectively  controlled  by  CWB  and ABB.
Second, the respective governments had made unilateral prior commitments to both CWB
and ABB.  Finally, STEs maintained legal and executive control over the instruments of
4 See also Paul R. Krugman (1990).
5 For a comprehensive survey, see J.A. Brander (1995).217
strategic trade and the quantity traded.  This, according to the studies, gave CWB and
ABB  an  advantage  over  independent  firms,  which  may  also  have  strategic  delegation
issues and asymmetric information problems.
Although available studies have indicated that the use of strategic trade theory is
more of an exception, the reality seems to be at considerable variance with this point of
view.  Over the past several decades, governments in the developed world, particularly
those of the United States and the European Union, have de facto used strategic trade
theory to maintain their domination over the global markets for major agricultural commodities.
6
The instrumentalities for using strategic trade theory were provided by the farm policies
that the United States and the European member countries have been adopting since the
1950s without being subjected to multilateral discipline.
7  For example, the farm policy
instruments are aimed at managing output in the markets that have often suffered because
supplies have far exceeded what the markets can carry.
The use of policy instruments by the United States and the European Union to
improve their advantage in the global agricultural markets has resulted in an interesting
debate in the context of the reshaping of the global agricultural policies, in which the World
Trade Organization (WTO) is currently engaged.  Initiated by the developing countries, this
debate makes the point that the persistence of distortions in the global agricultural markets
requires “strategic” interventions on their part.  These interventions combined with sound
distributive  policies,  they  argue,  are  necessary  for  safeguarding  the  livelihoods  of  the
multitude  of  marginal  farmers  that  dot  the  agricultural  landscape  in  their  countries  in
addition to ensuring that the food security concerns are met.
C.  A case for special products as ‘strategic’ interventions
The debate on agricultural trade liberalization that WTO negotiations created two
decades ago, has brought to the fore a range of issues that have posed serious challenges
to formulating trade policies.  Particularly significant in this context are the articulations
made by the developing countries, which claim that development concerns stemming from
the imperatives of meeting the objectives of food security and livelihoods have to form an
integral  part  of  the  new  trade  disciplines.    In  other  words,  those  countries  have  been
emphasizing  that  the  focus  of  trade  policy  must  shift  away  from  the  realization  of  the
free-trade ideal, as has been the case hitherto, to one that provides the space to use
instruments for meeting these development concerns.
6 While the United States and the members of the European Union control nearly 50 per cent of
wheat exports, the United States has a share in excess of 50 per cent in the exports of soybeans and
maize.
7 Although the United States has been using its farm policy to provide a strategic advantage to its
farm sector since the 1930s, it received legal sanction to use the farm policy instruments after the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Contracting Parties agreed to grant a waiver from the
application of Articles II and XI of GATT (see GATT [1955]).  In 1957, the Treaty of Rome (known more
often  as  the Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  Community)  established  the  basis  of  the
Common Agricultural Policy that has directed agricultural policy of the European Union member States.218
The cornerstone of this changed focus of trade policy-making, in the author’s view,
should  be  the  proposal  by  most  of  the  major  developing  countries  to  adopt  the  twin
instruments of Special Products (SPs) and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) as
a  way  to  address  concerns  of  food  security,  livelihoods  and  rural  development.
8  B y
suggesting the adoption of these instruments, the developing countries have emphasized
that  “strategic”  interventions  such  as  the  use  of  tariff  protection  are  essential  for  the
realization of development objectives.
Inadequacies in understanding the concerns raised by developing countries using
the traditional trade theory framework have been aptly demonstrated in a recent paper by
Ivanic and Martin (2006), in which they critically commented on the proposal to introduce
SPs that developing countries have made.  They commented that increased protection
from the use of SPs “effects poverty through three broad channels”.  The first is the effects
of commodity prices and wages on incomes in the short term.  The second is through the
efficiency of resource allocation, and hence aggregate real national income, as resources
are diverted away from the activities that yield the highest social returns into those that
generate the highest market returns at distorted prices.  The third is through changes in
productivity – as resources are diverted away from export-oriented activities towards import
replacement, productivity tends to fall.
With regard to the first point, it needs to be stated that while Ivanic and Martin were
concerned  about  the  detrimental  effect  of  commodity  price  rises  on  urban  consumers,
most developing counties would like to use SPs to influence commodity prices and wages
to benefit farm households.  It may be argued that the main reason for using the instrument
of SPs is to ensure reversal of the secular decline in commodity prices, and in particular
prices of commodities that are critical for providing livelihood security for farm households.
In past decades, low commodity prices have reduced the farmers in developing countries
to a marginalized existence; this situation can become far worse if the subsidized commodities
are allowed to enter developing country markets for “promoting” trade.
According to Ivanic and Martin (2006), the second adverse effect of protecting SPs
would be the diversion of resources “away from the activities that yield the highest social
returns  into  those  that  generate  the  highest  market  returns  at  distorted  prices”.    It  is
argued here that the purpose of SPs is precisely to divert resources into agriculture since
this would yield the highest social return in the medium to long term.  As indicated above,
the  policy  bias  against  agriculture  had  militated  against  the  flow  of  resources  into  the
sector, which supports an overwhelming majority of workforce in many developing countries,
including India.  This policy bias can be set right by providing adequate protection for
products that are sensitive in nature by using the mechanism of SPs.
They  commented  that  the  third  concern  was  that  SPs  would  result  in  diverting
resources  away  from  “export-oriented  activities  towards  import  replacement”,  causing
  8 The G33 group of developing countries took the lead in proposing that SPs and SSM should be
included in the new agriculture deal.  Subsequently, the G20 group also lent its support to the G33
proposal.219
productivity to fall.  This again exposes their limited understanding of economic realities.
Contrary to their understanding that SPs are to be viewed from the trade perspective,
developing countries have argued that SPs would ensure the realization of food security
and protection of livelihoods, which stand out among the major objectives of development
policy.    Those  countries  have  frequently  argued  that  that  the  twin  objectives  of  food
security and livelihoods protection should be viewed as non-trade concerns.
The issue of food security was identified as a major objective to be pursued by the
global community in the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food
Summit Plan of Action in 1996.  The Summit emphasized that food security existed when
“all people at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.  The
Rome Declaration took into consideration the multifaceted character of food security and
emphasized that “concerted national action and effective international efforts” were needed
to “supplement and reinforce national action.” The Plan of Action adopted by the World
Food Summit proposed that “each nation must adopt a strategy consistent with its resources
and capacities to achieve its individual goals and, at the same time, cooperate regionally
and internationally in order to organize collective solutions to global issues of food security.”
In addition to emphasizing the importance of national policies, the Rome Declaration and
the Plan of Action presented an interesting perspective on the role of trade in the pursuit of
food security.  The participating countries expressed their commitment to “strive to ensure
that  food,  agricultural  trade  and  overall  trade  policies  are  conducive  to  fostering  food
security  for  all  through  a  fair  and  market  oriented  world  trade  system.”    Thus,  quite
contrary to the view that imperatives of trade should be given primacy, as is the underlying
theme of the received wisdom in trade policy-making, the World Food Summit emphasized
that food security should be the primary concern of the global community.
The  emphasis  on  ensuring  food  security  by  making  all  possible  efforts  at  the
national level to do so, appear justified on at least two counts.  First, global trade in major
commodities has not expanded during the past decade despite the enhanced focus on
trade expansion, particularly since the establishment of WTO.  Table 2 illustrates this fact.
Table 2.  Share of global exports in production of major cereals
(Unit:  Percentage)
Global exports
1995 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004
to production
Rice 6 8 6 7 8 7
Wheat 23 22 24 26 25 23
Maize 17 14 15 16 15 13
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FOSTAT.220
As indicated in table 2, rice has been the least traded among the major cereals,
with global exports as a share of production not exceeding 10 per cent, since 1995.  Even
in the case of wheat, which is traded the most among the major cereals, the share of
global exports has not been significantly higher than a quarter of the global production.
Given such a scenario, countries would indeed be risking their futures if they decided to
rely on the global market for their food supplies.
This point is further corroborated by the fact that global stocks of major cereals
have been declining rather sharply since the late 1990s.  The figure below captures this
phenomenon.
It can be seen from the figure below that global stocks of the major cereals have
experienced steep declines since the late 1990s to reach their lowest levels since 1990.
The sharpest decline has been in case of maize, with global stocks having declined by
nearly 54 per cent since 1999-2000.
In summary, the message for policy makers is that it is necessary to retain enough
policy space for “strategic” interventions that seek to address development concerns as
important as food security, and rural employment and livelihood.  Such policy space may
include the ability to set import tariffs on selected agricultural products, as an affordable
way to counterbalance direct or indirect (and possibly “strategic”) support provided mainly
by developed countries to their own agriculture sector.  This is also a policy that may
encourage allocation of resources to rural areas, where most of the poor in developing
countries still live.  The literature has often failed to distinguish between policy interventions
of  the  kind  suggested  above  and  the  use  of  protectionist  measures  for  supporting  the
dominant interest groups.  It is hoped that the discussion in this chapter will contribute to
more careful and fuller consideration of the motives underlying the use of trade policy
instruments  in  development  strategies.    Furthermore,  the  same  more  careful  approach
should be useful when entering preferential trade negotiations, even when they are expected
to result only in a limited liberalization of trade.221
Year-wise ending stocks of major cereals, 1990/91-2006/07
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, “Production, supply
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